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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LAWRENCE CARDINAL, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: Case No. 981641-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has 
appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a, Section 3(2) of the 
Utah Code (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right after a guilty plea entered pursuant to Rule 11 (i) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appeal is taken from a final judgement of 
conviction for two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, second degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a) (1 953 
as amended). The appellant reserved the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the 
motion to suppress. The County Attorney consented to the reservation of that right 
and to this appeal. The trial court approved the entry of the conditional guilty plea. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did the slight and passing odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle, combined 
wi th nervous behavior from the driver, establish reasonable suspicion to extend the 
scope of detention for a traffic violation to allow questioning about matters unrelated 
to that violation? 
Did the equivocal statement, "I guess, if you want." in response to the officer's 
request to search that immediately followed intrusive questioning about the presence 
of controlled substances, constitute a voluntary consent to a search of appellant's 
vehicle? 
Was any consent given by appellant during an unlawful detention sufficiently 
attenuated from that fourth amendment violation to make the evidence seized 
admissible? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Factual determinations made on a motion to suppress are reviewed pursuant to 
a clearly erroneous standard. Legal determinations and the application of facts to a 
legal standard are reviewed without deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah, 1993). A trial court's determination of whether a 
particular set of facts establishes a reasonable suspicion is reviewed for correctness. 
That standard conveys a measure of discretion to the trial court's determination. State 
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 466 (Utah, 1995). The trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
consent was or was not voluntary is reviewed for correctness and the trial court is 
granted only limited discretion in its application of the legal standard of consent to the 
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facts. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand, Eight Hundred Dollars, United 
States Currency Ul L" I' "'1 \ 1 1 .1. I"111111 "' 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in an It iformation on January 28, 1998, (R. 2) That 
Information alleged two counts of Possession ui a i 
to Distribute, both second degree felonies ~ 1> * H-SO contained -* forfeiture 
allege * • . le 
a pre-trial motion to suppress all of the evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop 
and search of his vehicle. (R, 24-25) That motion was denied in a written order after 
an lyvfffenfi.i!1" ' hi1.mini fli 7C) H?) 1 a 
conditional guilty plea to Count I ••- • *• e Information pursuant to Rule 1 1 (i) of the Utah 
Huh1 '.»l ' iirrninl In "",!il"'j'iiii'"j lluit pk ' j , the appellant specifically 
reserved his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (R. 86) 
On September 22, 1998, the appellant was sentenced to serve a one to fifteen year 
i ( imiiulnii ' i i l .it lln I II ih SfatP Pn i mi Th.il nninilini'i i l -is slr iynl . I I I I I the ,HI[11u>III nil 
was placed i r ; robation. > * ' --i " sotice of appeal was filed on October 6, 
1998. (Ill : !. 1 , 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
January 22. 1998 the appellant was stopped by Utah Highway Patrol 
Sargei ! Mangelson 
Interstate ' * . u; l oun i v \i\-\i » 1 ' K at u Mangelson stoppea t^e vehicle 
becau -
 f rnnt and rear & 
.3 . 
vehicle had different numbers. (R. 11 5 at 89) Mangelson caught a slight whiff of fresh 
marijuana as he was at the side of the vehicle. (R. 11 5 at 1 2) Mangelson began to 
speak to the appellant as the appellant remained in the vehicle. (R. 11 5 at 11) He did 
not smell the marijuana again until he searched the interior of the vehicle. (R. 115 at 
69) While conversing wi th the appellant, Mangelson did note that the appellant was 
very nervous. (R. 115 at 13) Mangelson then went to the front of the vehicle and 
returned to the driver's window. (R. 115 at 37) Upon returning to the vehicle he was 
unable to detect the odor of marijuana. (R. 115 at 39) 
Mangelson questioned the appellant about that nervousness. (R. 11 5 at 60, 63) 
He then questioned the appellant about being engaged in illegal activities. (R. 115 at 
61) When the appellant denied being engaged in such activities, Mangelson requested 
permission to search. (R. 115 at 61) He stated, "[You] don't mind if I look real quick, 
do you?" (Video at 10:38:67) The appellant responded saying, "In my car?" (Video 
at 10:38:52) Mangelson responded, "yeah". (Video at 10:35:02) Appellant answered, 
"I guess, if you want." (Video at 10:38:52) Mangelson searched the rear seat of the 
passenger compartment. (R. 115 at 221) He then requested to search the trunk. (R. 
11 5 at 22, 65) The appellant stated he did not want the trunk searched. (R. 115 at 
22, 65) Mangelson stated he smelled the odor of marijuana while in the rear seat of 
the vehicle. (R. 115 at 66) He further indicated to the appellant that he was going to 
search the trunk anyway. (R. 115 at 24) When Mangelson opened the trunk, there 
was a overwhelming odor of marijuana. (R. 115 at 24) He placed the appellant under 
arrest. (R. 115 at 24) A search of the contents of the trunk resulted in the discovery 
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of about 200 pounds of marijuana and one pouiid of psilocybin mushrooms. (R. ! 1 5 
at 25) 
APPLICABLE RULES STATUES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
I he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and 110 Warrants shall 
issue, bt it upon probable cause, supported by Oath oi 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sergeant Mangelson's questioniiig of appellant about the presence of drugs and 
requesting to search the vehicle exceeded the scope ol the detention allowed for a 
traffic violation. To exceed the scope of ;u ' a limited detention j n officer needs 
g 
committed. *»• KJK sunn information n-.ai v..^ L:._. J . U I I :_una that Sergeant 
Mangelson had was a brief "wl nil 1 :> I raw marijuana and appellant's apparently 
nervous behavior. Fhat information failed to establish a reasonable suspicion in detain 
the appellant. The detention violated the fourth amendment and the evidence seized 
i'i .1 i CM ill I III in ill mi Il ii Hi i III In i i 1I i II In • '.iiiiiprHSsnl 
The consent to search given by the appellant was not voluntary as it was the 
product ul .1 I i (hi coercive situatio i consen il: to search was requested 
immediately following the sergeant's questions about the presence of drugs. The 
appellant did not specifically consent to such a search. 
-5-
Further, any consent that was given was not sufficient attenuated from the 
unlawful detention. It occurred during the unlawful detention, without intervening 
circumstances. It was the product of a purposeful and flagrant fourth amendment 
violation. The district court committed error in failing to grant appellant's motion to 
suppress. The search of the vehicle violated the fourth amendment. The seizure of 
evidence as a result of that search violated the fourth amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SERGEANT MANGELSON LACKED A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE APPELLANT TO INVESTIGATE 
BEYOND THAT ALLOWED FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION. 
The trial court ruled that the officer's initial detection of the odor of marijuana, 
combined wi th the appellant's nervous behavior constituted a reasonable suspicion. 
(R. 79-82) The trial court further ruled that such reasonable suspicion justified 
extending the scope of the detention beyond that allowed for a traffic stop. (R. 79-82) 
Any stop by a law enforcement officer will be considered unreasonable for 
purposes of the fourth amendment if the stop fails to meet either one of two criteria. 
First, the officer's action must be justified at its inception. Second, the officer's action 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). If the initial stop 
was not justif ied, the second inquiry need not be addressed. However, if the initial 
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stop was found to be justified, the court i leeds to examine the scope of the detention.1 
The initial basis for the stop--the inconsistencies in the front and rear license plates-
will not be questioned in this appeal. 
AftPi .1 . ill I li nth. .1 I. i I In. - •( tn f i " " . a* 1. -Mi i r I l l , liihiilt\l I he 
officer may temporarily detain the driver and occupants of a vehicle for the purpose 
of examining the driver's license and vehicle registration. State v. Schlosser, 7 / 4 I''.2d 
1132 (Utah, 1989). An officer may also have the dispatcher run a criminal history 
check on the driver. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1140 (Utah, 1 994). Once the reasons 
I ir 1111' i in) in f i 11 f 1111 11 in • i I in I' i it i . i f p 11 (• III il I i I f 11 i in 1 1 in ii in ill 1 1 1 i in in 11 ill ill 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 ill 1 1 I I a 
vehicle to proceed on his way State v. Robinson, 797 . .2d A3) ,Utah App. 1990). 
Any further detention must be justified by the presence of a reasonable suspicion of 
serious criminal activity, State v. Robinson, supra. The nature and sc ope of am i / 
further detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that render 
i t s i ir i i t i a t i o i II p e i i i i i s s i b I e State v. Johnson, 8 0 5 F 2 el J 6 I (I I I: a II i II 9 9 Ill) ( :: i t i i n g Terry 
v. Ohio, supra. 
Even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of ai i ii litially lawful search 
is unlawful under the fourth amendment. State v. Schlosser, supra, (citing Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987vx This has been interpreted to mean that any questioning 
I i l l III III I II I l II II II II l i l l II I " ! 111 111 III , I I I II III Il l i l t 1 y l II I I I | l l ( i l j l M l f | t I II II I , II III III II III III 1,11, 
With respect to this particular issue appellant concedes the analysis under 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 wotild be the same as the fourth 
amendment analysis. 
must be strictly tied to and justified by articulable suspicions. State v. Johnson, supra. 
These limitations were described by the court in State v. Lopez, supra, 
If reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity 
does arise, the scope of the stop is still limited. The 
officers must "diligently [pursue] a means of investigation 
that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 
during which time it [is] necessary to detain the appellant." 
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 
(1985)). 
873 P.2d at 1132. 
In State v. Robinson, supra, the appellants had been stopped for a lane change 
violation. The trooper testified that upon his first observation, the two appellants 
appeared to be nervous. The two told the trooper that they were taking a two week 
trip to Wyoming. However, the trooper noticed that there was no cold weather gear 
in the vehicle. The trooper also noted that the vehicle was not registered to the 
appellants. They had nothing in writing indicating that they had permission to possess 
the vehicle. A check with the dispatcher indicated that the registration was valid and 
that the vehicle had not been reported stolen. 
Based on these facts the trooper questioned the appellants about the contents 
of the van. A request to search was made and a dog alerted on a bed and a platform 
in the rear of the van. Marijuana was found under that area. In assessing the question 
of reasonable suspicion, the court refused to give any weight to the nervousness of 
the appellants. It also held that the lack of cold weather gear and the questions about 
the appellant's right to possess the vehicle did not constitute a reasonable suspicion 
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that they were engaged in the commission of any crinle. fhe continued detention was 
found to be illegal and the marijuana that was seized •/_ is ordered to be suppressed. 
A - in State v. Godina-Luna, 8 : t :i l : ' : '< I fifi: '" (I It< ill i ' | p. 
1 9 9 2 ) that case , t he appellant was stopped or suspicion of driving under the 
- <*n«aking w i t h Hu; d n v t i , t lv .^-^wv, -nc luae^ \\-..%\ ~-\ere w a s no 
impairment. A license check was run on the car. T hat check indicated that the owner 
lived in Salt Lake City, Utah. The oh'cie '"-ad t K ei reported stolen. The appellants 
for tl icit trip The deputy felt that traveling on 1-70 in Sevier County was suspicious 
because it was not a direct route from Salt Lake City to Chicago. 
In Godina-Luna the deputy testified that the appellants were extremely ner\ oi is 
during the encounter. Based : &* nervousness .'ind *'• -i loute oi travel t^e deputy 
^ - • vas 
done as the deputy retained possession of the vehicle registration and driver's license. 
The court Ileld that the detention and questioning exceeded the scope of a traffic stop. 
The court also held that the officers lacked any reasonable si ispi ::ioi i t :) qi lies ti : i i t l le 
occupants about narcotics. The cou r t s t a t e d , " T h e . -: t na t the appellants were 
lief" 'ours iitoH", m i l i i i r HI 1 I-MS i»i! <i In Hi" susp ic ion I "i 1111111 in i in II . I In: nil H, , , " ' 6 llJ" / m i l .nil l i ' V - i . 
The court further found that the indirect route of travel also failed to raise a reasonable 
suspicion. Since that detention was unlawfi il. ftie subsequent consent to search 
lacked sufficient attenuation from that illegality to allow the narcotics that were seized 
to be admissible in evidence. 
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Similarly, in State v. Hewitt. 841 P.2d 1222 (Utah App. 1992), the appellant 
was stopped for speeding. The trooper believed that the appellant was extremely 
nervous throughout the encounter. The trooper also described a lack of luggage in 
passenger compartment of the car and that the appellant was driving a vehicle rented 
in another person's name as factors that raised his suspicions. The rental agreement 
did name the appellant as an authorized driver. The trooper questioned the appellant 
about the presence of drugs and the appellant subsequently acquiesced to a request 
to search the vehicle. On appeal, the state confessed error in the trial court's finding 
that these factors constituted a reasonable suspicion to detain and question the 
appellant once the purposes of the traffic stop have been met. The evidence seized 
was ordered to be suppressed. 
In addressing the facts of this case, the court should look carefully at the 
sequence of events. When the officer's actions deviate from those allowed by a traffic 
stop the court must make a two part determination. First, there must a reasonable 
suspicion to justify that deviation. If that is established, the deviation must be 
reasonably related to the suspicious behavior. State v. Lopezf supra. A stop may be 
found unreasonable if the state fails to establish either of these requirements. 
In the case at bar, the appellant was stopped due to problems wi th his license 
plates. (R. 115 at 89) Sergeant Mangelson indicated he caught a slight whiff of raw 
marijuana when he first spoke to the appellant. (R. 11 5 at p. 12) However, he did not 
smell that again until after he was actually searching the vehicle. (R. 11 5 at p. 69) On 
the video tape, Mangelson did not question the appellant about this odor and asked 
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only one question about the license plates. He then focused on what he perceived to 
be the appellant's level of nervousness and asked three questions about that 
observation. (Video at 10:36:56 to 10:38:00) After checking the front license plate, 
Mangelson returned to the driver's window. (Video at 10:38:01) Mangelson testified 
that he did not detect the odor of marijuana. (R. 115 at 69) The appellant was 
questioned about his travel itinerary. (Video at 10:38:18) Mangelson again focused on 
the appellant's level of nervousness and asked if the appellant was doing anything 
illegal, had anything illegal in the car or was doing drugs. (Video at 10:38:33 to 
10:38:44) Mangelson then made a request to search the vehicle. (Video at 10:38:47) 
It is clear from the initial exchange that Mangelson was not concerned about the 
problem with the vehicle's license plate or the fact that he detected a slight whiff of 
marijuana. The clear focus of Mangelson's suspicion was the appellant's level of 
nervousness. As previously indicated, nervous behavior alone is not sufficient to turn 
a traffic stop into an investigation of other potential criminal behavior. Courts are to 
give no weight to nervous behavior. State v. Robinson, supra; State v. Godina-Luna, 
supra and State v. Hewitt, supra. 
Mangelson's testimony relating to the odor of marijuana should not be 
considered as reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant. Mangelson described it as 
a slight odor that he smelled only for a second. (R. 115 at 37) During the two minutes 
that he was questioning the appellant at the driver's window, he did not detect any 
other odor of controlled substances. (R. 115 at 69) This is clearly distinguishable from 
- 1 1 -
the situation is State v. Delanv, 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994), where the officer 
smelled an odor of burned marijuana. 
At the suppression hearing Mangelson testified that as he approached the 
appellant's car, the appellant rolled down the window and in that initial blast of air he 
detected a slight odor of raw marijuana. (R. 115 at 12) The odor was there only 
momentarily. (R. 115 at 12) He could not detect it any longer as he stood at the 
driver's side window. (R. 115 at 37) Mangelson walked to the front of the vehicle 
then returned to the driver's side window of the appellant's vehicle. (R. 115 at 37) 
Upon returning to that same position he was unable to again detect any odor of 
marijuana. (R. 115 at 38) 
Mangelson drew an analogy between his observations at the appellant's car and 
walking into a room where a cigarette has been smoked. (R. 115 at 70) He testified 
that after a moment, one no longer notices the cigarette odor. (R. 115 at 70) This 
analogy breaks down in two respects. First, Mangelson walked away from the 
window then returned. (R. 115 at 37) Upon returning, he did not notice any odor of 
marijuana. (R. 115 at 38) In leaving and returning to a room where a cigarette has 
been smoked, the smell will generally be detectable upon the return. The second 
problem wi th the analogy is that when a cigarette is smoked, it is gone, the odor is 
naturally in the process of dissipating. With the odor of raw marijuana, the reasonable 
assumption is that the marijuana is still present. If the raw marijuana is still present, 
the odor would not be dissipating. 
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The state may contend that the length or duration of this detention were 
minimal. However, that is not the appropriate test to determine if a detention is 
reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment. United States v. Sharpe, supra. 
The test for the reasonableness of a warrantless detention for fourth amendment 
purposes is whether the detention lasted any longer than necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. In other words, the scope of the detention must be carefully 
tailored to meet its underlying justification. Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
As previously noted even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an 
initially lawful search is unlawful under the fourth amendment. State v. Schlosser, 
supra. In the instant case, the actual length of the detention is not determinative. 
What is important is that Mangelson did not have an articulable suspicion to ask 
questions about either the presence of contraband in the vehicle, or the appellant's 
nervousness. Once the traffic stop was completed, the appellant should have been 
allowed to leave without being subjected to further questioning or to a request to 
search the vehicle. The detention of the appellant for the purpose of asking those 
questions violated the fourth amendment. 
POINT II 
AN EQUIVOCAL ACQUIESCENCE FOLLOWING INTRUSIVE 
QUESTIONING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VOLUNTARY 
CONSENT TO A SEARCH. 
The trial court ruled that Sergeant Mangelson had reasonable suspicion to 
expand the scope of a traffic stop to an investigative detention. (R. 79-82) The court 
also found that during the course of the search resulting from that detention, Sergeant 
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Mangelson discovered an odor of raw marijuana in the area of the rear seat of the 
vehicle. (R. 79-82) A search of a vehicle must be based on probable cause rather than 
a reasonable suspicion. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah, 1996), State v. 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220 (Ut. App. 1 995). Voluntary consent is another exception to 
the warrant requirement that would allow an officer to search a vehicle without 
probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
Although the trial court did not enter legal conclusions relating to the issue of 
consent, the court did make a factual finding that the appellant did consent to the 
search of the vehicle. (R. 82) Clearly, the trial court intended to make the same legal 
conclusion with respect to the consent issue. That was an issue that was raised and 
argued by the appellant in the trial court. (R. 24-25) This court reviews the issue of 
voluntary consent for correctness, in light of a limited amount of discretion to be 
offered the trial court. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand, Eight Hundred 
Dollars, United States Currency, supra. Further, there is no factual dispute on the 
voluntariness issue as all of the events and conversations between the appellant and 
Mangelson were recorded on a video tape. Consequently, this court is in a position 
to review the voluntariness issue without the specific findings and conclusions from 
the trial court. 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, the Court held that one of the well 
established exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth 
amendment is a search conducted pursuant to consent. See also State v. Thurman, 
supra. The Question addressed in Schneckloth was what must the prosecution prove 
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to demonstrate that the consent was "voluntarily" given. The Court rejected the 
appellant's argument that a voluntary consent to search must meet the same legal 
requirements as are needed to show "voluntariness" in a police interrogation. The 
Court noted that any coercion, explicit or implicit, would negate a voluntary consent. 
The Court ruled that a consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not be the 
result of duress or coercion. Voluntariness is also to be determined based on all the 
circumstances. The Court listed some of the factors to be considered when applying 
this totality of the circumstances test. Those include: the appellant's intelligence, 
whether or not the appellant was in custody, the nature of the police questioning, the 
environment in which the search took place, the appellant's knowledge of his right to 
withhold consent, and any other circumstances that weigh on the issue of 
voluntariness. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has described a number of factors that should be 
considered in determining if there was duress or coercion in obtaining consent to 
search. In State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1990), the court stated, 
Clearly, the prosecution has the burden of establishing from 
the totality of the circumstances that the consent was 
voluntarily given; however, the prosecution is not required 
to prove that the appellant knew of his right to refuse to 
consent in order to show voluntariness. Factors which may 
show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence 
of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the 
vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer, [footnote omitted] 
621 P.2d at 106. See also: State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1206 (Utah, 1995). 
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In State v. Marshall, this court recognized that the test for voluntariness must 
be based on the totality of the circumstances of the case. To determine if a consent 
is voluntary, a three part test was required. That test provides: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely 
and intelligently given"; 
(2) The government must prove consent was 
given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and 
(3) The courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived. 
791 P.2d at 888. In State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), the court 
applied the test from Marshall and the factors discussed in Whittenback. In State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1 201 (Utah 1 993), the court indicated that if a consent to search is 
obtained when the appellant is in custody, the state's burden is "particularly heavy" 
in demonstrating voluntariness. However, the court did indicate that the appellant's 
custodial status, standing alone, is insufficient to show a lack of voluntariness. A 
mere acquiescence to a request to search does not establish voluntariness. Bumper 
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Likewise, if the consent is the product of 
official intimidation or harassment, it is not voluntary. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 
(1991). 
In the case at bar, the appellant was confronted by Mangelson about his level 
of nervousness. (Video at 10:37:05 to 10:38:01) Mangelson then immediately asked 
a series of questions about whether the appellant was doing anything illegal and tied 
those questions into the appellant's nervous behavior. (Video at 10:38:37 to 
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10:38:47) The appellant denied being involved in illegal activities or drugs. (Video at 
10:38:40 to 10:38:44) Mangelson then asked, "You don't care if I look real quick, do 
you?" (Video at 10:38:47) The appellant responded, "In my car?" (Video at 10:38:52) 
Mangelson said "Yeah". The appellant responded "I guess, if you want." (Video at 
10:38:52) 
That evidence demonstrates that the consent was not voluntary within the 
meaning of either Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The appellant was detained at the time that he agreed to allow Mangelson to search 
the vehicle. Within seconds of the request to search, Mangelson asked a series of 
questions in an accusatory manner about the appellant's involvement in criminal 
activity. The detention combined with the nature, sequence and substance of 
Mangelson's questioning created an extremely coercive situation. This clearly fails to 
meet the second part of the Marshall analysis. 
The third part of the Marshall analysis is also not met in this case. When 
Mangelson first asked for permission to search, the appellant hesitated. The 
appellant's ultimate response "I guess, if you want" is not an unequivocal and specific 
consent to search as required by Marshall. At best, it is, a mere acquiescence to the 
trooper's request. That acquiescence had immediately followed a confrontational and 
highly intrusive series of questions posed by Mangelson. 
The procedures utilized here are ripe with coercion and duress. Further, the 
appellant's response was not unequivocal and specific. When the appropriate 
presumption against waiver is applied to this case, it must be concluded that any 
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consent that was given failed to meet the requirements of the fourth amendment. The 
information received as a result of the search of the interior of the veh ic le—the strong 
odor of raw marijuana in the rear of the vehicle—cannot be used to establish a basis 
to continue the appellant's detention or to search the vehicle. 
POINT 111 
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE LACKED 
ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL ILLEGAL STOP, 
MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED INADMISSIBLE. 
For evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to search, that consent 
must be voluntary and it must be attenuated from any prior illegal search or seizure. 
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289 (Utah, 1995), State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 
(Utah, 1 994). If the court finds that the consent is involuntary, this issue need not be 
reached. However, if the consent is found to be voluntary, then the court must 
determine if that consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention. State 
v. Thurman, supra. 
To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated from a prior illegal 
stop or search, an analysis of three factors is required State v. Arroyo, supra. Those 
factors were initially described in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1 975). The factors 
include: the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent, 
the presence or absence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy 
of the illegal police conduct. In a number of cases the Utah appellate courts have 
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analyzed these factors and found as a matter of law that the consent was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegal detention.2 
In State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1 992), the court of appeals held 
that the consent was not tainted by the prior illegal stop. In that case the officer 
stopped the appellant for a traffic violation. After returning the driver's license, 
registration and traffic ticket, the officer allowed the appellant to leave. The appellant 
did not do so, but stayed and asked the officer questions. During that conversation 
a consent to search the vehicle was obtained and contraband was found. This case 
is clearly distinguishable from Castner. The appellant in the instant case was never 
free to leave after the initial stop. Mangelson requested the consent to search 
immediately after the questioning about the appellant's involvement with narcotics. 
The detention that resulted from that questioning and the other questioning unrelated 
to the traffic stop constituted the fourth amendment violations. Any consent that was 
given was closely related in time to the illegal detention. 
The second factor from Arroyo involves an analysis of intervening 
circumstances. The instant case is indistinguishable from Shoulderblade where no 
such circumstances were found. In Shoulderblade the court described several potential 
intervening circumstances. One such circumstance would include the independent 
2
 State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 cert. den. 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah, 1 992); State v. Carter, supra; State v. Robinson, supra; State v. Godina-
Luna, supra; State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129 (Utah App.) cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). 
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discovery of additional evidence to justify the seizure. The court also indicated that 
the appellant's response to the police conduct, such as fleeing or attacking the officer, 
may constitute such a circumstance. For an event or information to constitute an 
intervening circumstance it must establish an independent basis for the acquisition of 
the questioned evidence. None of these circumstances or other analogous 
circumstances were present in this case. Consequently, this factor also weighs 
against the state. 
The final factor to be addressed under Arroyo is the purpose and flagrancy of 
the detention. In State v. Thurman f supra, the court utilized a sliding scale to analyze 
this factor and related it to the other two factors. The court noted that a fiagrant or 
purposeful violation would require a long passage of time or substantial intervening 
circumstances to alleviate the taint of the violation, On the other hand, a minimum 
passage of time or insubstantial intervening circumstances may alleviate the taint from 
a negligent fourth amendment violation. The instant case involved an experienced 
highway patrol sergeant asking questions about narcotics when he had no reasonable 
suspicion to do so. Mangelson also interrogated the appellant about his observations 
of what was believed to be nervous behavior. That is clearly a purposeful act by 
Mangelson. It involves a flagrant fourth amendment violation. This factor also weighs 
heavily against the state. 
Even if this court finds that the consent in this case was voluntary, that 
voluntariness was tainted by the prior illegal detention. The detention and any consent 
were closely related in time and there were no intervening circumstances. The fourth 
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amendment violation was done in a purposeful and flagrant manner. Consequently, 
the evidence seized as a result of the search of the appellant's vehicle is inadmissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Sergeant Mangelson did not have a reasonable suspicion to extend the scope 
of a traffic stop to an investigatory detention. By questioning the appellant about 
matters unrelated to the traffic stop without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
the appellant's fourth amendment rights were violated. Any consent given to search 
the vehicle lacked sufficient attenuation from the initial illegal detention to make it 
voluntary. Similarly, any consent that was given was not done voluntarily. 
Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of the detention and search of 
appellant's vehicle should be ordered to be suppressed. 
DATED this I / d a y of / U A V , 1999. T 
G.FRED METOJ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I cer t i fv lhat a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered srtif l t 
^ d a y of on this / Y d a y of May, 1999, to: 
Norman Plate 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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A D D E N D U M 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
LAURENCE J. CARDINAL, 
Plaintiff 
•n^Tanriant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 981600029 
DATE: July 2, 1998 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: David Sturgffl 
This maiter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and in opposition to 
the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On January 22, 1998, Officer Paul Mangeison of the Utah Highway Patrol observed 
Defendant's vehicle traveling northbound on 1-15. The rear License plate of Defendant's vehicle 
first drew the officer's attention. Ke "noticed something white across the plate." Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript {Transcript), pp. 5. Officer Mangeison caught up to the vehicle and took a 
closer look at the vehicle's plates. He stopped the vehicle because he observed a discrepancy 
between the numbers that appeared on the front and back license plates. 
Officer Mangeison approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked to see 
Defendant's license and registration. The officer noticed that Defendant's "hands were trembling" 
and that he appeared to be extremely nervous. Transcript, pp. 9-10. Also, the officer 
immediately detected a faint odor of raw marijuana. 
Because the officer suspected Defendant possessed marijuana he asked for Defendant's 
consent to search the vehicle. Defendant consented to a search of the driver and passenger 
compartments, but when he was asked to open the trunk, Defendant refused. As the officer 
searched inside the vehicle, he "could smell the odor [of marijuana] more clearly... and it 
seemed to be coming from the trunk area." Transcript pp. 12. Officer Mangelson testified that 
he searched the trunk without Defendant's consent because of the strong smeil of marijuana that 
appeared to be emanating from the trunk. Transcript, pp. 14. Officer Mangelson discovered in 
the trunk large quantities of marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms. Defendant was immediately 
mirandized and placed under arrest. 
Defendant asserts that Officer Mangelson's detention and search of his person and 
vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
As a result, Defendant moves the Court to suppress ail evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful 
search. 
Opinion of the Court 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: ''the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated [.]" U.S. CONST, amend IV; see also UTAH CONST, an. I, § 
12. The concern of the Fourth Amendment is against "unreasonable'*7 or unjustified searches and 
seizures; ^reasonable'' searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. 
In Utah, a peace officer may stop and question a person, without violating the Fourth 
Amendment, "when the omcer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, 
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v Pena, 369 ?.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting United States v ?'ace. 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)). Once the reasons for the initial 
stop have been satisfied, however, the individual must be allowed :o proceed on his or her way. 
Any further detention after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial stop is justified only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. See State v Robinson. 
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, Officer Mangelson initially stopped Defendant for what he believed to be 
improper licensure of the vehicle. The officer first noticed something peculiar about the rear 
license plate-he observed a white horizontal strip across the plate. Upon closer inspecrion, 
Officer Mangelson noticed a number discrepancy between the front and rear plates. Based on that 
discrepancy, he decided to stop Defendant's vehicle. Clearly, the officer's belief that Defendant's 
vehicle was not in compliance with Utah license and registration laws was reasonable, and 
2 
therefore, the initial stop was proper. See State v Naisbrtl 827 ?2d 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding trooper's inability to identify the paper in the vehicle's back window as a valid temporary 
registration permit justified the stop of the vehicle). 
As he investigated the apparent license plate problem, the officer noticed the odor of 
raw marijuana. In addition, the officer observed that Defendant's hands were shaking and that he 
appeared to be extremely nervous. The odor of marijuana combined with Defendant's extremely 
nervous behavior, raised the officer's suspicion that Defendant was engaged in more serious 
criminal activity. The officer's raised suspicion justified further detention and investigation. 
Additional investigation lead the officer to believe there was marijuana in the trunk of 
the vehicle. The officer testified that as he searched the rear passenger compartment of 
Defendant's vehicle he "could smell the odor [of marijuana] more clearly... and it seemed to be 
coming from the trunk area." Transcript, pp. 12. Under federal law, the odor of marijuana gives 
an officer justification to search a vehicle,, even absent a warrant or some other exception to the 
warrant requirement, such as consent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
recently noted this general rule: "This court has long recognized that marijuana has a distinct smell 
and that the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a 
vehicle or baggage:' United States v Morin. 9^9 F.2d 297,300 (10th Cir. 1991) {citinglhmA 
States v MerrvmarL 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1980)). TaQ constitutional basis for this rule is 
that "[a] strong, emanating odor of marijuana comes within the 'plain view1 doctrine and need not 
be ignored by officers." United Stares v Manbecki 744 F.2d 360, 380 n.34 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing 
linked States v Havnie. 637 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1980), cert demed sub nom., Fletcher v 
United States. 451 U.S. 972 (1981)). 
Utah courts have also applied the "plain smell" doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. 
In State v Banlev. 734 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989), the Court of Appeals noted: "Objects 
in 'plain view' constitute one . . . exception [to the warrant requirement], and may be seized 
without a warrant if the police officer is lawfully present and the evidence is clearly incriminating. 
This exception encompasses evidence within 'plain smeil[.]'" Because Officer Mangelson was 
lawfully searching the rear passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle when he detected the 
j 
• * * . trunk, his subsequent search ofthe trunk was justified, even 
odor of marijuana emanating from the trunk, bis suDseq 
absent a warrant, under the "plain smell" doctrine. 
Order 
Accorciingry.theDefendant-sMotionto Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this_/£_dayof July, 1998. 
c c : David 0. Leavirt, Juab County Attorney 
G. Fred Metos, Attorney for Defendant 
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